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George Stigler, the Nobel prize winner in economics in 1982, once wrote that
“economists exert a minor and scarcely detectable influence on the societies in which
they live” [Stigler, 1976, 351]. Whether or not Stigler’s lament was true 30 years ago
— and I am sure he was exaggerating his point to make a point — it is surely less true
today. Socialism has been replaced by capitalism almost everywhere. Economic regu-
lations have been rolled back or softened in many countries, most notably in the
United States. For better or for worse, and there has been some of each, the notion
that maximizing shareholder value should be the goal of the corporation has become
deeply ingrained, again especially in the U.S. Options, including nowadays even non-
marketable stock options granted to executives, are now routinely priced by the Black-
Scholes formula. Central bankers now not only think and talk like economists, they
often are economists. On these and many other issues, the thoughts and writings of
economists have been highly influential.1
But, all that said, I think it is clear that most economists are still frustrated by
how little influence sound economics has on public policy, not elated by how much.
From the mess that is our tax code, to the constant calls (sometimes heeded) for trade
protection, to the continued resistance to peak load pricing in many domains (though
it is accepted in others), and in much else, policy advice from economists is often
treated like what I call “air duct remarks”: Statements that are uttered at a meeting,
promptly ignored by everyone else in the room, and conveniently wafted away by the
air filtration system.
Today, I will examine Stigler’s lament from two complementary perspectives. The
pessimistic perspective concedes that Stigler had a point, and asks why economists’
contributions to the practical world are not larger than they are. The optimistic per-
spective takes note of the increasing influence of economists and economic ideas since
Stigler published those words 30 years ago, and it asks what we economists can do to
make the social marginal product of economic advice even greater than it is today.
Before you bolt for the door, let me make it clear that this will not be another one
of those tiresome lectures about how wonderful it would be if only those foolish and
feckless politicians would listen to the well-reasoned and disinterested — if not down-
right brilliant — advice of economic experts. Or, to be more accurate, it will not be
only about that, for I do actually have a good deal to say about how and why good
politics is often the mortal enemy of good economic policy. But my main, and far more
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perhaps even most of it, lies with us economists. I will argue that several critical
ingredients are missing from what economists typically offer as good advice—ingredi-
ents which, if provided, would make the recipe more digestible politically without im-
pairing the economic nutrition. In doing so, I will use standard economic concepts to
illustrate how the supply side of the market for economic advice could be improved.
Starting right now.
You can think of this as a lecture on a particular type of market failure — a
mismatch between the demand for economic advice from politicians and the supply of
economic advice from economists — and what might be done to remedy, or at least to
mitigate, that mismatch. The market for economic advice is one in which supply most
emphatically does not create its own demand, much as we suppliers might wish other-
wise. With Say’s Law failing so miserably, I will take the Keynesian perspective and
argue that we need to let demand create its own supply. And I’ll mention a few con-
crete ways to do this.
If a general principle underpins this analysis, it is that policies will not and should
not be adopted in a democracy unless they are judged acceptable by the majority (or
their representatives). But rather than offer a disquisition on abstract principles of
political choice, I prefer to illustrate my points with examples. Please pardon me for
using what may seem like ancient history by now, but the cases I know firsthand
come from the Clinton administration — which, by the way, probably had the best
economic-policy record in memory. Let’s start with this one:
A CASE IN POINT
In the fall of 1993, a proposal for a balanced-budget amendment to the U.S. Consti-
tution put President Bill Clinton in a tight political spot. The economics were dead
wrong, and he knew it. But he also knew that public opinion overwhelmingly sup-
ported the amendment. And he could therefore confidently predict that large majori-
ties in both the House and the Senate would vote for it, even though many legislators
knew it to be atrocious public policy.
Most important, the rookie President had just come through a political near-
death experience in pushing his deficit reduction program through a balky Congress.
In the process, Clinton had somehow transformed what had once been called “root
canal economics” — the apportionment of pain via raising taxes and cutting programs—
into the holy grail of American politics. How could he now turn around and oppose an
amendment that would inscribe fiscal rectitude in the Constitution?
The nature of the public-relations problem was clear. Consider three related poli-
cies: (1) reducing the budget deficit, (2) balancing the budget, (3) enacting a constitu-
tional amendment to require a balanced budget. To the cognoscenti, these three are
quite different animals. But they sound awfully similar to a layman. If deficits are
really so bad, why not go all the way to zero? And why not amend the constitution to
ban them forever? So opposing the balanced-budget amendment would put President
Clinton in an awkward, even seemingly inconsistent, position. We economists were
therefore worried about what he might decide to do. So were the administration’s
political types, though for precisely the opposite reasons.383 STIGLER'S LAMENT
But Clinton didn’t cave. In a letter to then-Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell,
the President forthrightly declared his “firm opposition to the proposed balanced bud-
get amendment,” noting among other things that it “is, in the first place, bad econom-
ics.” To a policy wonk, that sounds like the end of the story. Debate over. The Presi-
dent heard the economic arguments, considered the likely political fallout, and made
the right call. Good policy triumphed over good politics for a change.
If only life were that simple. In fact, Clinton’s letter was the beginning, not the end,
of a protracted battle to defeat the balanced-budget amendment in Congress. And we
economists were of little use in this battle because the substantive arguments against
the amendment barely registered on Capitol Hill. Many Members of Congress knew all
the arguments and yet were still prepared to vote for a constitutional amendment.
The field general of the administration’s campaign to defeat the balanced-budget
amendment was not an economist at all, but a skilled politician: Leon Panetta, a former
congressman from California. Panetta was then Clinton’s budget director, and he recog-
nized the proposed amendment for what it was: an economic and legal abomination. But
he also appreciated its political allure, and he understood something that we political
neophytes did not: that logic is a pretty ineffective weapon when you are battling an
atrocious policy that sounds politically attractive. Some Members of Congress were
irrevocably locked into supporting the amendment because of campaign promises; no
amount of logic would budge them. Others who were leaning in that direction might
possibly be persuaded to do the right thing. But to move a “yes” vote into the “no”
column, Panetta knew, we had to provide political cover. Two things were required.
First, legislators needed better reasons to oppose the amendment—better, that
is, than the astute, logical arguments offered by economists and legal scholars. Fur-
thermore, those reasons had to be customized for each wavering member. So for
Senator Wheat the argument might be, “But Senator, under this amendment, farm
subsidies would surely have to be cut.” For Senator Pentagon, it could be, “Senator,
don’t you realize that the balanced budget amendment could require drastic cuts in
defense procurement?” And so it went, in hand-to-hand political combat, one vote at a
time. This is not the way policy debates are conducted in the academy. But it did bring
the nature of budget constraints home to members of Congress.
Second, we had to give members something they could vote for. Courage is in
chronically short supply on Capitol Hill, and the balanced-budget amendment sounded
like the epitome of fiscal virtue to most voters. Elected officials in a democracy cannot
afford to get too far ahead of their constituents, even if they know better. So to give
political cover, the Democrats offered several alternative constitutional amendments,
including one that would have required a balanced budget excluding Social Security.
While it later became a reality (albeit briefly), achieving balance by this more
exacting definition looked absolutely impossible at the time. So the proposal would
never pass. But it created some attractive political atmospherics. A Congressman
could cast a cosmetic vote in favor of a balanced-budget amendment that exempted
Social Security and then oppose the real thing. Having done so, he could tell the folks
back home that he supported the right sort of balanced budget amendment, but not
one that threatened their Social Security benefits.
In the end, Panetta’s wise strategy prevailed. But the process took months and
required both patience and political sophistication. The economists’ conceptual argu-384 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
ments against the balanced-budget amendment counted for little. Had those been the
main weapons, a constitutional amendment might well have passed both houses of
Congress and been sent on to the states for ratification.
The moral of this story is the moral of this paper: Good economic ideas are not
nearly enough in a democracy. The political force must be with you, for citizens of a
democracy are governed by politicians, not by technocrats. Which is as it should be.
POLITICS TRUMPS ECONOMICS...
Politics regularly makes a hash out of economic policy for many reasons. Some of
them are valid, for no society can or should live on economics alone. But others are
unfortunate — and occasionally do grievous harm to policy. Let me take those up first.
Time horizons and transition costs
I begin with the matter of time horizons, which are quite long in much of eco-
nomic analysis and excruciatingly short in politics. Economists like to think of this
issue as the choice of the social discount rate, short time horizons being equivalent to
high discount rates. But the two are not quite the same.
The dispassionate economic reasoning favored by academics is extremely useful
when it comes to prescribing appropriate long-run, ahistorical remedies. But it can be
pathetically inadequate when it comes to analyzing the short-run consequences of
policy changes or the process of getting from here to there in real time. For example,
any economist worth his salt (and most who are not) can explain to you why free trade
is good for a nation.2 But, truth be told, some people lose their jobs any time interna-
tional trade is liberalized. In economics, we refer to painful adjustments like that as
“transition costs,” which makes them sound like small potatoes. Then we proceed to
ignore them. But to an older worker who loses his job to foreign competition, the
“transition” might constitute the rest of his working life.
The contrast with politics could hardly be sharper. That politicians cannot see
past the next election is a common lament, but the truth is actually far worse. The
political pros who advise politicians often cannot see past the next public opinion poll.
In fact, their natural time horizon extends only until that evening’s news broadcasts.
If you want to call that a high discount rate, go right ahead — but the discount rate
would have to be in the millions of percent per annum. While serving on President
Clinton’s Council of Economic Advisers, I developed a mantra that I murmured re-
peatedly (usually under my breath) when we economists were arguing with the politicals:
“There is no election next Tuesday.” But the politicals typically acted as if there were.
Their objective was clear: to get past the current news cycle with maximum gain or
minimum pain. We’ll worry about tomorrow tomorrow.
You Gotta Have a Gimmick
A second generic problem was exemplified by the balanced-budget amendment:
There is often a huge chasm between policies that sound good and policies that actu-385 STIGLER'S LAMENT
ally are good. Political discourse thrives on—indeed requires—simple slogans. So poli-
tics often leads to what I have called the T-shirt mentality:3 To be marketable in the
political arena, an idea must be short and snappy enough to be emblazoned on a T-
shirt. (Example: “Balance the budget!”) But as Alfred Marshall taught us a century
ago, any economic idea expressed that tersely is almost certainly wrong; there are
always qualifications.
Sometimes it’s not a slogan at all, but rather an artificially-selected number that
somehow takes on a mystical aura. One stunning example arose soon after Bill Clinton’s
original five-year deficit-reduction program reached Capitol Hill in early 1993. Some-
one noticed that, if you added up the five annual deficit reduction figures projected in
the plan, you fell just short of $500 billion ($473 billion to be exact). With a bit more
oomph, the five-year total could be boosted to the magic $500 billion mark.
Now, such a five-year sum is a pretty unimportant number to which we policy
wonks had paid no attention whatsoever in formulating the budget plan. There were
far more essential things to worry about, such as the timing of the annual tax in-
creases and expenditure cuts (for aggregate-demand reasons) and how much perma-
nent deficit reduction remained into the indefinite future. And, economically speak-
ing, there was no substantive difference between a five-year sum of, say, $473 billion
or $500 billion.
But as it turned out, there was a world of difference in the realm of political
symbols. So from that day onward, policy was bent out of shape to hit the $500 billion
figure. The resolution of such substantive issues as the size and timing of the new tax
on gasoline and whether or not the upper-bracket personal income tax increases would
be retroactive became prisoners to the precious $500 billion target.
Standards of Evidence
A third problem is that the standards of evidence used to distinguish between good
and bad policy ideas are amazingly lax in the political arena. There is a tremendous
irony here. In the academic world, where we routinely prepare papers that perhaps
two dozen other people will ever read, the standards of evidence are quite strict.
Proofs must be exact. Econometric techniques must be up to snuff. Scholarly papers
routinely get rejected by journals for picayune errors. And what is at stake in the
answer? Nothing but intellectual integrity. But in the world of policy, where so much
is at stake, the hurdle of evidence is set pathetically low.
I felt this paradox viscerally in the early days of the Clinton administration—and
I do believe that the Clinton team produced the best economic policy in the U.S. in
decades. After only a few weeks of butting heads with the administration’s political
and message people, it dawned on me that we had developed a tacit but strange work-
ing definition of what constituted “good policy:” If a proposal sounded good, either in
its design or, more commonly, in its objectives, it was taken to be good policy.
So, for example, we successfully championed (over Republican opposition) a large
increase in the budget for the Head Start program, which provides pre-school educa-
tion for underprivileged children. Expanding Head Start was, in my view, an excellent
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had a high benefit-cost ratio — though perhaps not with 95 percent confidence. But
wasn’t there a limit on the number of dollars than could be spent effectively, even on
such a fine program? Surely there was, but we had no notion of how much was enough.
In fact, the question of where marginal costs matched marginal benefits never arose.
Speed Kills
A fourth respect in which politics makes minced meat out of rational policymaking
is the torrid pace of Washington life. Sometimes the high-speed chase is unavoidable.
So be it. But often the people charged with developing policy options are forced to
sprint toward deadlines that are artificially imposed by message meisters or politi-
cians. The results are predictable: shortcuts, sloppy work, and errors. That is pre-
cisely what tripped up the Reagan economic team in early 1981, as David Stockman,
his budget director at the time, later confessed.4
When the Clinton administration took office, exactly 12 years later, did we learn
from the missteps of the harried Reagan team? No. We emulated them by racing to
meet a tight February 17th deadline that was not imposed in any way by law. Why such
a rush? (Remember, inauguration day was January 20th.) One key factor was certainly
that the Reagan budget had been presented to Congress twelve years earlier on Feb-
ruary 18th. We would beat them by a day! The breakneck speed inevitably led to
several mistakes — none of which, fortunately, proved to be particularly serious or
damaging.
Political experts will argue that the orderly, deliberate decisionmaking processes
favored by technicians are wont to lead nowhere. You must strike while the iron is
hot, else political life will pass you by and nothing will ever get done. That is surely
true at certain critical junctures of history, and technocrats should not ignore it. But
I do not believe that mad dashes toward artificial deadlines generally produce good
policy—whether judged by economic or political criteria. More often than not, haste
makes both economic and political waste.
The original Clinton budget plan, which we dashed to complete by mid-February,
was pretty well designed given the tight time constraints. But it was not enacted into
law until early August. Would, say, a four-week delay in its release date—which would
have doubled the time the economic team had to work on it—have done the plan any
political harm? Looking back further in time, if the Reagan administration and Con-
gress had proceeded at a more deliberate pace in 1981, would Congress have passed a
tax cut so wildly excessive that it felt compelled to start repealing it the very next
year? Sometimes — no, make that often — slower is better.
Sequencing and “Irrelevant” Alternatives
Another aspect of scheduling in which politics rolls over economics is the sequenc-
ing of policy debates in time. Policy wonks rarely give this factor a second thought.
But it is always prominent in political minds. And here, I believe, the politicians have
got it right.
In the academy, issues are judged one-by-one, each on its own intrinsic merits.
The order of battle does not affect the substantive pros and cons, and therefore cannot387 STIGLER'S LAMENT
possibly affect the decisions. If a long-run policy change is judged beneficial in Janu-
ary, it will still be judged beneficial in May. Furthermore, the sequencing of unrelated
matters in time should be irrelevant. After all, how could it possibly matter whether
the government stakes out its position on a trade agreement before or after it deals
with health care reform?
There is a closely-related principle of rational decisionmaking that many of you
will remember from graduate school: the independence of irrelevant alternatives.
Loosely speaking, this principle states that whether you prefer lamb chops to lobster
or vice-versa should not be affected by the presence or absence on the menu of some
other dish that you dislike (such as sweetbreads).
But the political world does not operate by such neat, rational rules. Seemingly
irrelevant alternatives turn out to be maddeningly relevant for a variety of reasons.
One is logrolling: If my support for your bill hinges on your support for mine, it may be
helpful to take up the two bills closely in time. And since the congressional machinery
can cope with only a limited number of serious issues at once, this linkage may crowd
other — even more “irrelevant” — issues off the legislative calendar entirely.
Accidents of geography also link issues that are intrinsically unrelated. As Tip
O’Neill famously observed, all politics are local; and elected legislators are true ex-
perts on what will please and displease their constituents. If the voters of, say, Iowa
are asked to swallow some bitter pill (like the loss of a military base), their represen-
tatives in Congress may insist on sugar-coating it with some kind of “unrelated” goodie—
like an ethanol subsidy.
Another reason has its origins in what might be deemed a more economically
legitimate concept: the need to husband valuable political capital. A president or prime
minister can augment his stock of political capital with a series of legislative victories,
or he can fritter it away in a string of defeats. Each victory raises the leader’s political
cache, thereby easing the way to subsequent legislative victories. Each loss squanders
precious political capital and makes achievement of his remaining agenda more elu-
sive. Even a bruising battle that ends with a “win” can leave a residue of ill will that
will hurt later. So presidents and congressional leaders care mightily about the se-
quencing of issues in time, as they should.
I came to appreciate the importance of sequencing by watching the agenda of the
first Clinton administration unfold. And a similar drama played out in the United
States last year, when the Bush administration’s decision to move Social Security
reform first and hold tax reform for later probably doomed tax reform.
Back in 1993, it was decided early on that the budget, which included a great deal
of new policy, would have to come first — even though we knew it would encounter
fierce political resistance. At one point prior to the President’s celebrated February
17th economic address, Hillary Clinton and Ira Magaziner, who headed the health care
task force, and George Mitchell and Dick Gephardt, who were then the majority lead-
ers of the Senate and House, argued for bundling a health-care proposal into the
budget package. They had two reasons: fear that the large expenditure of political
capital that would be needed to pass the budget would damage the chances for health-
care reform, and knowledge that the budget reconciliation bill (unlike other legisla-
tion) could not be filibustered to death in the Senate. And they were right on both
counts. But the idea of melding the budget and health care into one gigantic piece of388 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
legislation was vigorously opposed by the economic team and quickly rejected. Among
the (good) reasons was a stark fact: No health care plan would be ready by that time.
Late in 1993, the scheduling contest shifted to health care versus the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). With congressional approval of NAFTA far from
assured, and with many members of the President’s own party vehemently opposed, it
would clearly take a major effort by Clinton to push NAFTA over the top. More politi-
cal blood would doubtless be spilled in the process, thereby further diminishing the
chances for health care reform. A battle royal ensued within the administration over
whether health care or NAFTA should be next out of the chute—or, indeed, whether
the Clinton administration should devote much political capital to passing NAFTA at
all. For a variety of reasons, including the fact that NAFTA was projected to start in
January 1994, the decision was made to move NAFTA first. Health care reform would
have to wait again, even though it was the president’s top legislative priority. In the
end, the fears of the health-care team were proven correct: The President did spend a
great deal of political capital on NAFTA and that did hurt the chances for passing
health-care reform.
Welfare Functions: Whose Gets Maximized?
Last, but most assuredly not least, economic and political perspectives differ — in deed,
though not in word — on this fundamental question: Whose interests should economic
policy serve? Or, in the economists’ jargon, whose welfare function should be maximized?
Economists instinctively champion the broad public interest and rebel against
special pleading — hence the term “social welfare function.” It’s almost a Pavlovian
response. We do so even when the promised benefits from a policy—like a broad trade
agreement — are diffuse and barely visible to the public at large while the costs
imposed on affected people and industries are concentrated and palpable.
Politicians see things quite differently. Naturally, they pay lip service to the na-
tional interest, just as they salute the flag. But their stock-in-trade is performing
constituent service for an array of special interests — often defined by the boundaries
of their legislative district. And they always remember who helped them get elected
(and who will help next time).
Politicians and economists agree on one thing: that policies (such as special tax
favors) that confer large and visible benefits on the few paid for by small, mostly
invisible levies on the many probably win you more votes than they lose, while poli-
cies (such as free trade agreements) that hurt identifiable interest groups in order to
sprinkle small, diffuse benefits on the amorphous public are apt to be political losers.
But the two sides disagree sharply when it comes to assessing the policy implica-
tions of that observation. Economists, or at least those who are not in the employ of
special-interest lobbies, invariably take principled if naive stands against special plead-
ing. After all, since we never have to face the voters, nobility costs us nothing. Politi-
cians, who must regularly stand for reelection, are naturally more concerned with
self-preservation. Let me illustrate this general point with another Clinton adminis-
tration example.
The United States once had a large and thriving fleet of merchant vessels. But
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industry—to put it mildly. Other nations can and do provide commercial shipping
services far more economically than America can. What remains of our shipping in-
dustry is largely on life support—including generous subsidies from the federal gov-
ernment and restrictive legislation that mandates the use of U.S. carriers on certain
routes. The maritime industry is surely one of America’s clearest examples of what
the Europeans call “lemon socialism.”
Why, you might wonder, is the American taxpayer asked to shoulder such a bur-
den? The putative answer is what it often is in such cases: national security. The
United States may have the greatest navy in the world, but the Pentagon fears it may
not have enough shipping capacity should a major war break out—and I mean the old-
fashioned kind of war that requires armadas of supply ships. Yes, Virginia, we may
live in an age of electronic warfare, but the U.S. Navy is afraid that it doesn’t have
enough frigates. The solution? Keep the American flag flying over the decks of pri-
vately-owned merchant vessels so the Navy can commandeer them in time of need.
Okay, let’s accept that. After all, who are we economists to question the national
security judgments of the Pentagon? So let’s imagine a war massive enough to exceed
the supply capabilities of the entire U.S. Navy and Air Force, and yet proceeding at
such a leisurely pace that commercial ships can be refitted for military use in time.
(The 2003 Iraq War was apparently not such a war.) Nonetheless, there must be some
limit on the number of ships we need to hold in reserve for this purpose. At a large
interagency meeting on the question of maritime subsidies in June 1993, I suggested
what I thought was an unobjectionable principle: The Pentagon’s own estimate of its
maximal requirement ought to be the upper limit on the number of vessels we even
think about subsidizing. Surely everyone could agree on that.
Well, not quite everyone. The man from what I came to call the “Department of
the Transportation Lobby” reacted with horror. No, we need to maintain subsidies for
at least 92 ships, not just for the 58 that the Pentagon says it might require in time of
war.5 And besides, Senator Shipping would be greatly distressed by the loss of jobs in
his state — as he has already made clear to the President. You can probably guess
how this debate turned out.
. . . AS IT SHOULD AND MUST
The differences between good economics and good politics are basic, profound, and
profoundly frustrating for an economic adviser. Formulating intelligent social policies
that take proper account of the myriad of relevant factors is challenging enough in
this complex world, where social welfare functions are a good deal more complicated
than the beloved U(C1, C2, …) of our theoretical models. Now, layer on top of all that:
short political time horizons, the frenzied pace of decisionmaking, the need to gener-
ate ideas with superficial sound appeal, and the maddening intricacies of legislative
scheduling. Then you really have a tough problem.
But those are the rules of the game. Those seemingly-extraneous political consid-
erations are not really extraneous at all—because all significant policy decisions are
and must be at bedrock political.6 Remember that the word democracy means rule by
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beliefs and aspirations of ordinary citizens better than technocrats do. If you rely on
technicians to take the case to the public, you are likely to be sorely disappointed.
Furthermore, the political system in a country like the United States is afflicted
by a powerful form of inertia analogous to what economists model as fixed costs of
decisionmaking. As we know, such fixed costs lead to what Avner Bar-Ilan and I [1992]
once called “the optimality of usually doing nothing.” Borrowing terms from inventory
theory, the effects of some actual policy are allowed to drift between some boundaries
S and s until some major shock (or an accumulation of little shocks) pushes it out of
this range. Then policy is adjusted by a comparatively large amount.
In fact, it usually takes a force stronger than pure reason to break the bounds of
political inertia. One ingredient is the role of slogans, which academics view with
disdain, if not indeed contempt. In America’s heavily checked and balanced system of
government, considerable political energy is required to get anything meaningful ac-
complished. You must somehow rouse the sleeping electorate and mobilize the rel-
evant interest groups, as President Bush tried (unsuccessfully) to do with Social Secu-
rity reform. In such campaigns — and they really are campaigns—slogans and sym-
bols are more effective than learned dissertations, for mass politics displays little
tolerance for complexity. So Darwinian selection breeds elected officials who care
more about what sounds good than about what is good.
The desire to balance the federal budget is an excellent case in point. On strictly
economic grounds, there is nothing special about a current budget deficit of exactly
zero. The government’s accounting constructs are arbitrary and, in places, odd. The
economic effects of, say, a $28 billion deficit, a balanced budget, or a $28 billion surplus
are virtually indistinguishable in our gigantic economy. Indeed, changes in account-
ing conventions can easily change one into the other. Furthermore, economists have
argued for years over using more complicated budget concepts such as capital budget-
ing, generational accounts, or even present-value budget constraints.
Now let’s imbibe a dose of reality. Voters can relate to the number zero in a way
they cannot relate to, say, the number 28. Budget balance strikes them as a reason-
able and comprehensible target. So, during the Clinton years in Washington, this
intrinsically unimportant symbol was immensely valuable in bringing the deficit mon-
ster to heel. I doubt that much political support could have been mustered for any of
the more abstract goals that economists might (and did) conjure up. Just compare the
political allure of “balance the budget” to that of “stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio.”
Next, take those short time horizons. Politicians are surely guilty of myopic con-
centration on the here and now. But economists are often equally guilty of telescopic
concentration on the distant future. Our analysis is wont to focus doggedly on the
long-run consequences of a policy action, to the exclusion of many of the transitional
problems that loom so large in the lives of ordinary people. Will I lose my job to
foreign competition if NAFTA is approved? Will tax reform reduce the value of my
home? Will my cable or telephone service suffer as the telecommunications industries
adjust to deregulation?
No, the nation does not hold elections every Tuesday, and making policy as if it
does courts economic disaster. But, as Keynes wryly pointed out, in the long run we
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pen in the next one or two or five years. Policies that ignore such crucial realities do
not occupy a higher moral or intellectual plane. Rather, they court political disaster.
Modern economics has developed a second blind spot: distributional consequences.
When contemplating changes in, say, tax, trade, or regulatory policies, economists
generally think first — and often last — about questions of efficiency. Will the policy
make our market system function more or less smoothly? Is it a cost-effective way to
achieve the stated goal?
These are fine questions — and highly relevant, too. By assigning them far too
little weight, politicians regularly squander the national treasure. But economic effi-
ciency is not uppermost in the minds of the citizenry, nor therefore of their elected
representatives. John and Jane Q. Public want to know who gets the gain and who
gets the pain. They want to hear reasons why the losers should be asked to sacrifice
for the good of the winners — especially if they are among the losers. Some of those
answers may be deemed acceptable; people are not always selfish. But others will not
be. These are legitimate questions, and economists who refuse to address them are
not contributing to better economic policy. They are contributing to their own irrel-
evance. Our precious Pareto criterion does not provide useful answers because, as we
all know, compensation is virtually never handed out in practice.
Here’s a pertinent example. In selling agreements that expand the realm of free
trade, politicians understand that they must address fears of job loss and community
disruption. Economists may assure you that the new high-wage jobs created by en-
hanced opportunities to export to Mexico will outweigh the low-wage jobs lost to Mexi-
can competition. And we are right. But the poor folks who lose their low-wage jobs in
El Paso will not secure the new high-wage jobs in San Jose. Why should these unfor-
tunate souls be asked to pay the price? The case for free trade is not airtight until
something is done to compensate its victims — something real, not something theo-
retical.
While the analytical aspects of the calculus of pain and gain involve numerous
difficult technical issues, they at least fall squarely within the realm of mainstream
economic analysis. But when it comes to actually deciding who should reap the ben-
efits and who should pay the bills, technicians must yield the floor to politicians. It is
not for economists to say whether one group of people should be favored over another.
It is for elected politicians.
COMPROMISE, NOT RIGHT VERSUS WRONG
America’s vaunted system of checks and balances was designed to be frustrating;
Madison & Co. intended it that way. The United States is, in this respect, quite differ-
ent from many parliamentary democracies. No president of the United States ever
has the kind of control that, say, a British prime minister with a working majority
has. Even Lyndon Johnson, whose landslide victory in 1964 swept waves of Democrats
into both houses of Congress, had to beg, cajole, and threaten the Congressional bar-
ons. Even Roosevelt was thwarted by, among others, the Supreme Court.
Compromise is often said to be the essence of politics, and this is nowhere truer
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tax, or Social Security reform almost certainly require broad, bipartisan support. That
means coalition building, vote trading, logrolling, difference splitting — and compro-
mise, compromise, compromise. The policies that emerge from such political horse
trading are unlikely to follow the neat contours designed by economic technicians.
More likely, they will be ungainly creatures whose central organizing principles are
hard to fathom, if indeed they exist at all. It’s a bit like attaching the head of a cow and
the tail of a pig to the body of a camel. But technicians must learn to live with such
homely creations, even if they never grow to love them.
I still remember my first reaction (other than relief) to passage of Clinton’s five-
year deficit reduction package in August 1993. The proposal that the administration
had released in February was already — from my economist’s point of view — marred
by numerous political compromises. Some of them made for less-than-glorious policy.
And as the plan wended its way through the House, the Senate, and several confer-
ence committees, things got steadily worse. The painstakingly-designed BTU tax,
which made real sense economically,7 was replaced by a hike in the gasoline tax so
puny that it was hardly worth the political bloodletting it would provoke. The congres-
sional barons made a hash out of many of the President’s so-called “investments.”
When the reconciliation bill finally passed, I could not generate much enthusiasm for
the final product. Was this what we had all worked so hard for?
But I soon developed a much more sanguine view of what had been achieved. We
had, after all, taken a big bite out of the deficit apple — a nagging problem that had
plagued our economy for more than a decade. While doing so, we had simultaneously
made the tax system more progressive, and greatly expanded both the Earned Income
Tax Credit for the working poor and the Head Start program for children at risk. We
had also initiated what is now called Americorps, starting it on a scale grander than
ever achieved by the Peace Corps. And there was lots more. All in all, not bad for a
half-year’s work in the American system of government. If the final product left a few
policy wonks feeling frustrated, that was a trivial price to pay. Real-world policymaking
is all about satisficing, not maximizing. The accomplishments of government should
always be graded on the curve.
HIGH POLITICS VERSUS LOW POLITICS
Policy without politics is neither feasible nor desirable. But politics comes in vari-
ous shapes and sizes. The trick is to emphasize what I’ll call the “high politics”—the
mediation of competing claims and ideas, and deemphasize the “low politics” — poli-
tics as sporting event. Unfortunately, America has not been doing a very good job of
this for some years now.
High politics is what we were all taught in civics classes. It is the politics of Hamilton
vs. Jefferson, of Lincoln vs. Douglas, of Roosevelt vs. Hoover. High politics is about
clashes between competing philosophies and visions of government. It is about how
the champions of alternative policies duke it out in the public arena. The combat may
be rough and tumble, but the focus is squarely on the ideas and the policies.
But politicians are neither purists nor saints. So political battles, like political
motives, are apt to be less than pristine; political debates less than lofty. Message,393 STIGLER'S LAMENT
parliamentary tactics, and raw political power may play larger roles than expertise
and evidence. Deals are struck. Logs are rolled. Compromises are forged. The whole
process resembles a heavyweight boxing match more than the Oxford-Cambridge
Debating Society.
Even when politics sticks to the high road, the economic merits of an issue nor-
mally take a back seat to the politics. Sometimes they are not even invited along for
the ride. But that’s a good deal better than when low politics holds sway. Then the
economic equities get treated like road kill.
If high politics is like boxing, low politics is more like mud wrestling. The contest
among ideas degenerates into battles for partisan or individual advantage. Argument
and debate give way to invective and spin. Competing philosophies are smothered by
political gamesmanship. Legitimate mediation of competing claims turns into an un-
seemly squabble over who gets to feast at the public trough. It is not a pretty sight.
Unfortunately, gamesmanship has been elevated to absurd heights in contempo-
rary Washington, where politics is second only to professional football as the town’s
favorite sport. For years now, political clashes have often not been about ideas at all,
nor even about policy. They are simply about winning and losing — winning and
losing what is considered less important. Here’s an example of this curious contact
sport that I witnessed from a front row seat 13 years ago.
In seeking ways to combat the President’s 1993 economic proposals, Congres-
sional Republicans quickly coalesced around an amazingly simple strategy: just say no
— to everything. Their intent was not to reshape the policies in ways that Republicans
found more congenial, but to inflict maximum political harm on the newly-elected
president.
So Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole successfully used a filibuster to block a pro-
posed economic stimulus package. Now, reasonable people could have argued that the
1993 economy did not require any stimulus; the magnificent wisdom of hindsight
certainly supports that position, because economic growth accelerated after 1993. And
the particular bill that the Clinton administration laid on the table was clumsily de-
signed. But the actual debate over the stimulus was not fought on these grounds. The
Republicans did not argue that stimulus was inappropriate at the time because the
economy was strong; nor did they try to refashion the package in ways that were more
to their liking. In fact, there wasn’t any real policy debate at all, just a display of
obstinacy. Dole’s objective was simple: to hang a defeat around the new president’s
neck — and he did. The same strategy was subsequently used, on a grander scale and
with even greater political success, to kill President Clinton’s health insurance pro-
posals. There was no alternative Republican-backed proposal.
While these two examples cast the Republicans as the villains, Democrats play
this game, too. Indeed, in 2005, they successfully applied the “just say no” strategy to
President Bush’s proposals for Social Security reform. There was no Democratic coun-
terproposal. And, of course, the nay-saying game was not invented in 1993.
Low politics manifests itself in other unattractive ways as well—such as name
calling, personal attacks, and scandal mongering. These tawdry aspects of contempo-
rary political sport are nothing new. After all, Jefferson and Hamilton were called
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seem to be growing more omnipresent — and more virulent. Washington observers
who are far more experienced than I report that the level of nastiness has been rising
like the tide for more than a decade. The main effect of all this mudslinging is to make
more and more viewers want to change the channel to something more genteel —
say, the World Wrestling Federation, for example.
 If you want to know why more and more of our citizens are tuning politics out, ask
yourself this simple marketing question. What do you think would happen to the national
appetite for hamburgers if McDonald’s and Burger King constantly bombarded us with
ads condemning the other’s vile products rather than extolling the virtues of their own?
But this is all surface stuff. The truly deplorable aspects of low politics hardly ever
make it to the TV screen and, indeed, are barely visible to the public at large. What
happens in the shadows is known only to the insiders. Earmarked spending is the cur-
rent manifestation, and it has grown like topsy in recent years — leading to such bud-
getary wonders as the $225 million bridge to an Alaskan island with just 50 inhabitants.8
But precisely the same thing goes on with “members’ provisions” in the tax code.
One of my all-time favorite examples was unearthed by Jacob Weisberg [1986],
then of The New Republic, while Congress was working on tax reform in 1986 —
which, by the way, was a truly stellar piece of legislation. On page 651 of a mon-
strously long draft tax bill, a list of exceptions to the general crackdown on abuse of
municipal bonds contained a cryptic reference to “an area of a city described in para-
graph (4)(C).” If you turned to that paragraph, you did not learn the city’s name, but
you did find out that it had more than 2.5 million inhabitants and an American League
baseball team. Hmmm. That leaves New York (the Yankees) and Chicago (the White
Sox). More information was waiting in section 145(d)(3), if you could find it. It located
the city in a state whose new constitution took effect on July 1, 1971. Bingo! If you
were in the know, that identified the state as Illinois and the city as Chicago. What a
surprise — Congressman Dan Rostenkowski of Chicago then chaired the House Ways
and Means Committee. Turning back to page 651, you found that the law exempted
redevelopment projects approved before July 1, 1986 in a neighborhood which the City
Council declared to be blighted on November 14, 1975. Now, how many projects do
you think fit that description?
I said that outrages like this are virtually invisible to the average man and woman
on the street. In the small, that is true. Few citizens are aware of the bizarre special-
interest favors that Congress routinely bestows. But, in the large, people do get the
message. Some scams are unmasked by intrepid journalists; others get revealed by
clumsiness or accident; a few come to light because of sheer chutzpah. As a result,
people come to believe that unseemly shenanigans take place on a daily basis. The
public may see only the tip of the iceberg, but that tip is big enough to convince them
that the governmental deck is stacked against them. And it is more than enough to
turn people off on politics.
IT TAKES TWO TO TANGO
Economists regularly complain that crass politics ruins good economic policy. Po-
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point of this lecture is to emphasize that both have valid points. Politics has its seamy
side, to be sure. But it is not some extraneous fluff that interferes with rational
policymaking; it is and must be the essence of democratic decision-making. And this is
especially true in the peculiarly inertial American system of government, where there
is simply no possibility of making headway on any public policy issue unless the politi-
cal force is with you.
So what’s a poor economic adviser to do? As usual, the principle of comparative
advantage points to a good place to start. Economists excel at the dispassionate, disin-
terested analysis that, more often than not, leads to the right conceptual answer. It is
not that we economic policy wonks hold wrong-headed views on these matters; more
often than not, we have it right. There really is no election on most Tuesdays. Evi-
dence does beat hunches as a basis for policy formulation. The substantive merits of a
policy will ultimately matter more to the public than the slogans that helped sell it.
Haste does frequently make waste. The broad public interest really is more important
than narrow special interests.
But the realities of politics do not permit such tidiness of thought. Considerations
such as those just mentioned may be of limited interest in the political world. Splendid
logical arguments are unlikely to move voters. Technical analysis certainly will not
persuade interest groups. Empirical evidence will not push a bill through Congress.
Economists cannot do any of the things that are necessary to move legislation. The
politicals at least have a shot.
So let me sum up some of the key lessons we economists can learn from the
politicals. First, doing policy without politics is an illusion in a democracy; it is neither
feasible nor desirable. Second, since gimmicks and slogans are vehicles for breaking
through the overwhelming inertia of America’s system of government, we should not
turn up our noses at them; and we should remember the KISS principle (“Keep it
simple, stupid.”) Third, it is a mistake to ignore or belittle transition costs. Fourth, it
is another mistake to ignore or belittle distributional consequences. Fifth, whether
we like it or not, the sequencing of issues in time really does matter.
Given all this, how can economists play a greater and more constructive role in
the policy process? My short answer, which sounds glib but is actually deep, is that
good economic policy is best achieved through a series of carefully-arranged mar-
riages between cerebral economists and worldly politicos. I use the term “marriage”
here advisedly. I once believed that the ideal way to formulate economic policy would
be for politicians to give their economic advisers the social welfare function that is to
be maximized, and the political constraints on that maximization, and then let ‘em
rip. Appending the political constraints to the conventional economic constraints would
put us economists back on the familiar terrain of constrained optimization.
But I have learned over the years that this vision is naïve. The problem is that, in
the slightly-crazy world of politics, the political constraints and even the welfare func-
tion are apt to change unpredictably over time. At any moment in time, it may be
possible, at least conceptually, to maximize social welfare subject to both political and
economic constraints. But the political constraints may change abruptly—as, for ex-
ample, when one of those “irrelevant alternatives” gets resolved or changes shape.
And even the objective function may change as one constituency is paid off while396 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
another suddenly becomes deserving. There is no way that economists can forecast
these twists and turns in the policy process, and therefore there is no way to take
them into account in the original maximization.9 The “optimization” would have to be
done over and over again in real time.
That thought is what brings me to the marriage metaphor. Husbands and wives
are, of course, engaged in a never-ending set of exchanges of information, negotia-
tions, and compromises over issues that could never have been anticipated in ad-
vance. A good marriage is characterized by a process of constant give and take, and
constant adaptation to ever-changing circumstances, always leavened by good will.
Similarly, to get better economic policy, economists and political types must be joined
together in a lasting union—not in a series of one-night stands. They must interact
regularly, with each coming to understand the other’s comparative advantage. To be
sure, these will be old-fashioned arranged marriages founded on convenience, not
romances based on love. But if we can increase the frequency and durability of such
unions, and limit divorces, Stigler will ultimately be proven wrong.
NOTES
The views expressed here have developed over many years, during which I have learned from
many people. I am indebted to Eytan Sheshinski for helpful comments on this draft and to
Princeton’s Center for Economic Policy Studies for financial support.
1. These and other examples are discussed in Blinder [2000].
2. There are, of course, theoretical exceptions. There always are.
3. See Blinder [1987], Chapter 1.
4. See Stockman [1986].
5. The numbers are entirely fictitious. They were a national security secret at the time, and I don’t
remember them, anyway.
6. However, in Blinder [1997], I have questioned whether we make too many public policy decisions
on political, rather than technocratic, grounds.
7. A carbon tax made even better sense, but that idea was still-born because it would have hit some
identifiable constituencies (e.g., West Virginia) extraordinarily hard.
8. One wag pointed out that the government could have purchased 50 helicopters for less money.
9. I am claiming that this is a case of Knightian uncertainty rather than risk. No one knows the
probabilities.
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